TOTP - shorten the provisioning URL, use random instead of urandom

[istr]

Currently the provisioning URL for the TOTP includes the hostname and the string Mail-in-a-Box Control Panel.

This leads to a large format QR code that is not supported by some hardware TOTP devices.
Replacing this with the fixed string pmiab will produce a small format QR that has better support / better interoperability.

The random source for the shared secret could be switched to /dev/random using the flag os.GRND_RANDOM. The average miab box should always have enough entropy to read 20 bytes from there.

The provided inline patch (two trivial changes) could be used to solve this issue.

diff --git a/management/mfa.py b/management/mfa.py
index 5650010..a858980 100644
--- a/management/mfa.py
+++ b/management/mfa.py
@@ -94,13 +94,13 @@ def validate_totp_secret(secret):
 
 def provision_totp(email, env):
        # Make a new secret.
-       secret = base64.b32encode(os.urandom(20)).decode('utf-8')
+       secret = base64.b32encode(os.getrandom(20, os.GRND_RANDOM)).decode('utf-8')
        validate_totp_secret(secret)  # sanity check
 
        # Make a URI that we encode within a QR code.
        uri = pyotp.TOTP(secret).provisioning_uri(
                name=email,
-               issuer_name=env["PRIMARY_HOSTNAME"] + " Mail-in-a-Box Control Panel")
+               issuer_name='pmiab')
 
        # Generate a QR code as a base64-encode PNG image.
        qr = qrcode.make(uri)

[ddavness]

This leads to a large format QR code that is not supported by some hardware TOTP devices.

Usually the issuer name is for certain apps Not making light of this statement, but for curiosity here - are there hardware TOTP generators capable of reading QR codes? The issuer name should be descriptive enough so that a user of certain apps like Authy/Okta Verify/etc. can display it to the user (pmiab won't cut it, but I think I might be able to come up with a shorter name).

The random source for the shared secret could be switched to /dev/random using the flag os.GRND_RANDOM

What is the benefit of doing that? Unless you don't want to risk the machine generating "insecure" bytes (which might not be too much of a big deal), you're just adding the possibility of /dev/random blocking in the process of generating the secret.

[istr]

What is the benefit of doing that?

Not much -- just an idea.

but for curiosity here - are there hardware TOTP generators capable of reading QR codes?

Yes. At least there is the ReinerSCT authenticator series https://shop.reiner-sct.com/authenticator (I have one with exactly the problem mentioned here). It supports scanning QR codes and time sync QR codes and is completely offline (not even a USB interface - only power and a camera). I don't know if there are any other products/providers around.