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This repository has been archived by the owner on Jan 24, 2024. It is now read-only.
Absolute Path Traversal due to incorrect use of send_file call
A path traversal attack (also known as directory traversal) aims to access files and directories that are stored outside the web root folder. By manipulating variables that reference files with “dot-dot-slash (../)” sequences and its variations or by using absolute file paths, it may be possible to access arbitrary files and directories stored on file system including application source code or configuration and critical system files. This attack is also known as “dot-dot-slash”, “directory traversal”, “directory climbing” and “backtracking”.
Root Cause Analysis
The os.path.join call is unsafe for use with untrusted input. When the os.path.join call encounters an absolute path, it ignores all the parameters it has encountered till that point and starts working with the new absolute path. Please see the example below.
Since the "malicious" parameter represents an absolute path, the result of os.path.join ignores the static directory completely. Hence, untrusted input is passed via the os.path.join call to flask.send_file can lead to path traversal attacks.
In this case, the problems occurs due to the following code :
Here, the filename parameter is attacker controlled. This parameter passes through the unsafe os.path.join call making the effective directory and filename passed to the send_file call attacker controlled. This leads to a path traversal attack.
Proof of Concept
The bug can be verified using a proof of concept similar to the one shown below.
This can be fixed by preventing flow of untrusted data to the vulnerable send_file function. In case the application logic necessiates this behaviour, one can either use the werkzeug.utils.safe_join to join untrusted paths or replace flask.send_file calls with flask.send_from_directory calls.
Absolute Path Traversal due to incorrect use of
send_file
callA path traversal attack (also known as directory traversal) aims to access files and directories that are stored outside the web root folder. By manipulating variables that reference files with “dot-dot-slash (../)” sequences and its variations or by using absolute file paths, it may be possible to access arbitrary files and directories stored on file system including application source code or configuration and critical system files. This attack is also known as “dot-dot-slash”, “directory traversal”, “directory climbing” and “backtracking”.
Root Cause Analysis
The
os.path.join
call is unsafe for use with untrusted input. When theos.path.join
call encounters an absolute path, it ignores all the parameters it has encountered till that point and starts working with the new absolute path. Please see the example below.Since the "malicious" parameter represents an absolute path, the result of
os.path.join
ignores the static directory completely. Hence, untrusted input is passed via theos.path.join
call toflask.send_file
can lead to path traversal attacks.In this case, the problems occurs due to the following code :
Anakin/docs/api_on_web/__init__.py
Line 26 in 5fd68a6
Here, the
filename
parameter is attacker controlled. This parameter passes through the unsafeos.path.join
call making the effective directory and filename passed to thesend_file
call attacker controlled. This leads to a path traversal attack.Proof of Concept
The bug can be verified using a proof of concept similar to the one shown below.
Remediation
This can be fixed by preventing flow of untrusted data to the vulnerable
send_file
function. In case the application logic necessiates this behaviour, one can either use thewerkzeug.utils.safe_join
to join untrusted paths or replaceflask.send_file
calls withflask.send_from_directory
calls.References
This bug was found using CodeQL by Github
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